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ABSTRACT
In recent years, cyber aacks have caused substantial nancial
losses and been able to stop fundamental public services. Among
the serious aacks, Advanced Persistent reat (APT) has emerged
as a big challenge to the cyber security hiing selected companies
and organisations. e main objectives of APT are data exltration
and intelligence appropriation. As part of the APT life cycle, an
aacker creates a Point of Entry (PoE) to the target network. is
is usually achieved by installing malware on the targeted machine
to leave a back-door open for future access. A common technique
employed to breach into the network, which involves the use of
social engineering, is the spear phishing email. ese phishing
emails may contain disguised executable les. is paper presents
the disguised executable le detection (DeFD) module, which aims
at detecting disguised exe les transferred over the network connec-
tions. e detection is based on a comparison between the MIME
type of the transferred le and the le name extension. is module
was experimentally evaluated and the results show a successful
detection of disguised executable les.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy → Intrusion detection systems; Net-
work security; •Networks→ Network monitoring;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber aacks have become more widespread and several aacks
have made headline news over the last 5 years, targeting industrial
companies and governmental organisations [1] [2]. ese aacks
have caused substantial nancial losses and been able to stop fun-
damental public services. e annual cost of cybercrime was $3
trillion in 2015. Furthermore, it is expected to increase to more than
$6 trillion per annum by 2021 [3]. e term cyber aack generally
refers to criminal activities lunched via the Internet, aiming usually
at nancial gains or stealing condential data. Additionally, the at-
tackers can spy and monitor the target organisation and disturb its
functions, motivated by a political, ideological or criminal goal [4].
ese challenges have brought much interest in the research and
investment towards developing new tools and approaches for cy-
bersecurity. In recent years, Advanced Persistent reats (APTs) [5]
have emerged, hiing selected companies and organisations. e
main objectives of APT are data exltration and intelligence ap-
propriation. is aack targets selected organisations and persists
on the completion of the aack until it is achieved. e economic
damage due a successful APT can be very expensive. Furthermore,
the aacker can compromise the target network for a long period
of time without being detected. is type of aack is currently one
of the most serious threat to the cyber security [6].
As part of the APT life cycle, an aacker creates a Point of
Entry (PoE) to the target network. is is usually achieved by
installing malware on the targeted machine to leave a back-door
open for future access. A common technique employed to breach
into the network, which involves the use of social engineering, is the
spear phishing email. ese emails, which may contain disguised
exe les, continue to be a favoured means by APT aackers to
inltrate target networks [7]. In a typical spear-phishing aack, a
specially craed email is sent to specic individuals from a target
organization. e recipients are convinced through clever and
relevant social engineering tactics to either download a malicious
le aachment or to click a link to a malware or an exploited site,
starting a compromise [8]. e malicious link may lead to a drive-by
download aack, in which the user’s computer can be infected with
malware by only visiting a web site that contains the malicious
content. en, the malicious code which is installed on the victim’s
machine can control the infected machine and perform malicious
activities [9]. Typically, sensitive data is exltrated, passwords are
stolen and keystrokes are recorded.
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In [10], we present a correlation-based system for APT detec-
tion, which runs through two main phases. First, eight detection
modules are employed to detect the individual APT steps. ese
modules are Tor connection detection [11], malicious SSL certi-
cate detection [12], malicious le hash detection [13], malicious
domain name detection [14], domain ux detection [15], malicious
IP address detection [16], scan detection and disguised exe le de-
tection. Second, a correlation methodology including clustering
algorithms is utilised to correlate the steps related to one APT cam-
paign. is paper presents the disguised exe le detection (DeFD)
module, which aims at detecting disguised exe les transferred over
the network connections. e detection is based on a comparison
between the MIME type of the transferred le and the le name
extension.
e rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives
an overview of the APT life cycle. Current approaches for APT
detection are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed
methodology for the disguised exe le detection. Experimental
evaluation is provided in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 THE APT LIFE CYCLE
APT refers to Advanced Persistent reat. APTs are a cybercrime
category directed at business and political targets. APTs require a
high degree of stealth over a long period of operation in order to
be successful. e aacker usually aims for more than immediate
nancial gain, and infected systems continue to be compromised
even aer the target’s network has been breached and initial goals
reached [5]. Figure 1 depicts the steps of the APT aack [17].
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Figure 1: Typical steps of the APT attack.
(1) Intelligence gathering: is initial step aims to get informa-
tion regarding the target, like its organizational structure,
IT environment and even about people who are working
for that target. For this purpose, the aacker can use public
sources (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twier, etc) and prepare a
customized aack. rough this step the aacker tries to
nd and organize accomplices, build or acquire tools, and
research target/infrastructure/employees.
(2) Initial compromise (Point of entry): Performed by use of
social engineering and spear phishing, over email, using
soware vulnerabilities [18]. Another popular infection
method is planting malware on a website which the victim
employees will be likely to visit.
(3) Command and control (C&C) communication: Aer an
organization’s perimeter has been breached, continuous
communication between the infected host and the C&C
server should be preserved to instruct and guide the com-
promised machine [19] [20]. ese communications are
usually protected by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryp-
tion, making it dicult to identify if the trac directed to
sites is malicious. Another technique can be used in this
step is domain ux technique [21]; an exploited host may
try to connect to a large number of domain names which
are expected to be C&C servers. e goal of this technique
is to make it dicult or even impossible to shut down all
of these domain names.
(4) Lateral movement: Once geing access to the target’s net-
work, the aacker laterally moves throughout the target’s
network searching for new hosts to infect. e aacker
can use brute force aack [22], to obtain information such
as a user password or personal identication number (PIN);
an automated soware is used to generate a large number
of consecutive guesses as to the value of the desired data.
Another technique is pass the hash aack [23], in which
the aacker steals a hashed user credential and, without
cracking it, reuses it to trick an authentication system into
creating a new authenticated session on the same network.
(5) Asset/Data discovery: is step aims to identify and iso-
late the noteworthy assets within the target’s network for
future data exltration. Port scanning can be used for this
step [24].
(6) Data exltration: Data of interest is transmied into ex-
ternal servers which are controlled by the aacker. ere
are some techniques used for data exltration like built-in
le transfer, via FTP or HTTP and via the Tor anonymity
network [25].
3 RELATEDWORK
e APT detection is a challenge for the current Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs), and much research has been conducted to address
this type of multi-stage aack. e authors in [26] propose an ap-
proach based on C&C domains detection. is approach processes
the network trac and depends on a conclusion that the connection
to the C&C domain is independent, while the connection to the
legitimate one is correlated. In [4], the authors introduce an active-
learning-based system for APT detection. is system detects the
malicious PDFs les which might be included in a phishing email
or a malicious website.
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e work in [27] describes a context-based system for targeted
aacks detection. is system models APT as an aack pyramid,
where the aack objective is on the top of the pyramid. en, e
environments, where the APT steps take place, form the lateral
planes. e authors in [28] presents an APT detection system called
TerminAPTor. is system tracks the information ow aiming
to correlate meta alerts, generated for the individual APT steps,
that may belong to one APT campaign. ese meta alerts are
fed to the system by an agent, which can be a standard IDS. e
system explained in [29] is similar to TerminAPTor. However, the
meta alerts are correlated based on a statistical methodology. e
proposed framework describes APT as a multi-stage aack running
through ve stages which are delivery, exploit, installation, C&C
and actions. Furthermore, it considers each stage to include several
activities.
e authors in [30] explore Duqu, which is a piece of malware
was used to launch an APT against a European company. e main
objective of this APT campaign was data exltration. Additionally,
this work presents a toolkit developed to detect the Duqu mal-
ware. is toolkit includes six investigation tools to analyse the
trac related to the Duqu malware. In [31], a framework to detect
phishing emails is proposed. ese phishing emails are utilised to
initiate the point of entry for an APT. is framework performs
a mathematical and computational analysis to cluster emails into
malicious or benign ones. e developed algorithm makes use of
”Tokens”, which are paerns of words and characters such as (DHL,
notication, delivery, label, invoice and post).
A machine learning approach is introduced in [32] for APT detec-
tion. e algorithm utilises four features extracted from the users’
trac which are the open ports, memory usage, CPU usage and
number of les in the system32 folder. A normal trac is used to
build the normal baseline of the system. en, a piece of malware,
previously used in an APT campaign, is installed on a network ma-
chine and the malicious trac is recorded. Dierent classication
algorithms are trained on the collected trac to build the detection
model. e authors in [33] employ the Data Leakage Prevention
(DLP) for APT detection. e proposed methodology is based on
monitoring the data trac and utilise the DLP to detect data leaks.
Next, leaks paerns are created based on the aributes of the data
leaks.
From the presented related work, we can see that APT forms
a problem for the current IDS in terms of real time detections.
Furthermore, the steps of APT may occur over a day, week, month
or even a year. is makes the alerts correlation a serious challenge.
Additionally, missing the detection of one step or more of APT
campaign makes it dicult to investigate the full APT scenario. A
correlation-based system is proposed in [10] for APT detection, and
this work is a step towards building the proposed framework.
4 DISGUISED EXECUTABLE FILE
DETECTION (DEFD)
According to Mandiant APT1 report [34], spear phishing is the
most commonly used technique to get the point of entry in APT.
e spear phishing emails contain either a malicious aachment or
a hyperlink to a malicious le. e subject line and the text in the
email body are usually relevant to the recipient. Executable les
supposed to end in .exe are made to appear as simple document
les (pdf, doc, ppt, excel) to convince the victim to click on it.
e DeFD module detects disguised exe les transferred over
the connections. Meaning, it detects if the content of the le is exe
while the extension is not exe. Figure 2 shows the methodology of
DeFD; the network trac is processed, all connections are analysed
and all exe les identied when transferring over the connections
are ltered. is ltering is based on the le content. Following
this, the le name extension should be checked to decide about
raising an alert on disguised exe le detection.
Match with
file name extension
Alert on
disguised exe file detection
exe file
Network traffic
Connections
Packets
Events
Output
Figure 2: Methodology of the disguised exe le detection.
Dierent security systems are used to monitor the network traf-
c [35]. Bro is used to implement the DeFD module. Bro is a network
security monitor which can passively analyse the network trac
and generate informative events. ese events provide information
about specic network activities [36].
Algorithm 1 shows the implementation pseudo-code of the DeFD
module. e network trac is processed; this module waits for
le over new connection event to be generated by Bro. is event
indicates that a le has been seen in the process of being transferred
over a connection [37]. en describe() function is applied on that
le; this function provides a text description regarding metadata of
the le, so the le name can be extracted.
is method is able to detect disguised exe les in both cases, up-
loaded and downloaded, but DeFD aims to detect only downloaded
disguised exe les, as they are the ones used in the second step of
APT. us, DeFD checks the current connection, in which a new
le has seen being transferred, if it is established by a host from the
monitored network. is is done by checking the connection source
IP address through is local addr function; this function returns true
if an address corresponds to one of the dened local networks, false
if not. For this reason, the subnet of the monitored network should
be dened.
Following this, the mime type [38], which can be extracted
from le over new connection event, is checked for its presence
in t exe le table. t exe le table contains the MIME types of the
les which DeFD aims to nd and lter, i.e. MIME types of exe
les. erefore, if the transferred le is an exe le (based on its
mime type), DeFD checks whether the extension in the le name
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#fields timestamp     alert_type                orig_h               orig_p resp_h         resp_p infected_host malicious_file
#types time              string                      addr                 port    addr            port     addr               string
1407424021.202210  disguised_exe_alert 147.251.17.197 56973 207.244.73.42 80 147.251.17.197 SkypeSetup.pdf
1407424040.255414  disguised_exe_alert 147.251.17.197 53105 207.244.73.42 80 147.251.17.197 ViberSetup.doc
#close 2014-08-07-19-15-07
Figure 3: e log produced by the DeFD module.
Algorithm 1 Implementation pseudo-code of DeFD
1: Input: t exe le table
2: Get le over new connection event
3: fname← le name
4: if the connection is established by one of the network’s hosts
then
5: if the le MIME type is in t exe le table then
6: if le MIME type = fname extension then
7: if the same disguised exe alert has been raised dur-
ing the previous 24 hours then
8: goto End
9: else
10: Generate an event (disguised exe alert)
11: Write disguised exe alert into dis-
guised exe detection.log
12: Notify the network security team via email
13: Deny generating the same disguised exe alert
during the next 24 hours
14: end if
15: else
16: goto End
17: end if
18: else
19: goto End
20: end if
21: else
22: goto End
23: end if
24: End
is exe; this le name extension is extracted from the output of the
describe() function previously mentioned. If the le name extension
is not exe, this means it is a disguised exe le. Before an alert is
raised, DeFD checks if an alert regarding the same host and for
the same disguised exe le has been generated during the previous
day. is check is to ensure that DeFD does not generate the same
alert about the same set (host, le) during one day, therefore, DeFD
checks if the current set exists in the t suppress disguised exe alert
table, this table contains all detected sets during the last day.
If the current set (host, le) had not been detected during the
previous 24 hours, DeFD generates disguised exe alert event to be
used in the FCI correlation framework. e malicious connection
information is wrien into a specic log disguised exe detection.log,
to keep a historical record of the monitored network. An alert
email regarding disguised exe le detection is sent to RT (Request
Tracker) [39], where the network security team can perform addi-
tional forensics and respond to it. e current detected set (host, le)
is added into the t suppress disguised exe alert table where it stays
for one day to ensure that DeFD does not generate another alert
about the same set during the same day. e wrien information
into disguised exe detection.log is:
timestamp = c$start_time ,
alert_type = "disguised_exe_alert"
connection = c$id
infected_host = c$id$orig_h
malicious_file = fname
5 EVALUATION RESULTS
To evaluate the eectiveness of the DeFD module, a download of
disguised exe le was simulated via the campus network. An ex-
perimental server was set up, using Bro, to passively monitor the
campus live trac. DeFD was run on that experimental server for
the purpose of disguised exe le detection. Two exe les were ran-
domly selected, SkypeSetup.exe and ViberSetup.exe, and their names’
extensions (exe) were changed into pdf and doc extensions, i.e.
SkypeSetup.pdf and ViberSetup.doc respectively. e two disguised
exe les were uploaded to the speedyshare.com public server. en
a host working on a computer connected to the Internet through
the monitored network was used to connect to that public server
and download the modied les. As shown in Figure 3, DeFD was
able to detect both malicious downloads and write the information
regarding each connection into a specic log.
is experiment was repeated a hundred of times using dierent
disguised exe les with dierent extensions. DeFD was able to
detect all the malicious les, the average detection delay was 270
ms with a standard deviation of 54 ms. Figure 4 shows an example
of a Disguised exe ticket, which was emailed to RT.
Greetings,
 
the security team CSIRT-MU detected involvement of the IP address
147.251.17.197 into the following incident:
 
Incident type: Disguised_exe
Time of detection: 2014-08-10 15:07:01 +0100
IP address: 147.251.17.197
Domain name: ---
 
Details of this incident can be found at this address:
https://reports.csirt.muni.cz/A4FE72DC-65A8-1C74-8627-5664BE78D732
 
Best regards,
CSIRT-MU, the security team
 
                Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2014 15:07:19 +0100
Figure 4: An example of a Disguised exe ticket.
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
e appearance of new forms of cyber aacks, such as APT, has
created new challenges to the current (IDSs). APT has emerged as
a serious threat to the cyber security hiing selected companies
and organisations. is paper presents the disguised exe le de-
tection (DeFD) module, which aims at detecting disguised exe les
transferred over the network connections. e detection is based
on a comparison between the MIME type of the transferred le and
the le name extension.
As our future work, this module is to be used as part of a
correlation-based IDS system for APT detection. e APT step
detected by this module should be correlated with other steps,
which are detected by other modules, to nd the full APT scenario.
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